The Boeing 737 MAX Debacle
A white paper on how the 737 MAX was unwisely certified and what needs to be done
Introduction
This white paper explains how Boeing and the FAA’s delegation of certification authority caused the 737 MAX crashes. Within the Boeing 737 MAX’s first year of commercial service, two crashes killed 346 people. This is entirely unprecedented in aviation history, at least since the Comet in the 1950s that had three crashes within one year and ended UK leadership of commercial aviation.
First, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board. On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed in a field near Bishoftu, Ethiopia, killing all 157 people on board. Ethiopian Airlines immediately grounded its MAX fleet, and China grounded all 737 MAX planes. The European Union grounded the 737 MAX on March 12, followed by Brazil and Canada on March 13. The FAA followed a few hours later, acknowledging, what many already knew: “the possibility of shared causes for the two incidents.”
This white paper is dedicated to the grieving families of the victims of the two unnecessary crashes and their incredibly hard work to right the wrongs of Boeing and the FAA. Boeing’s struggle to fit larger and more fuel-efficient engines on to the 737 MAX airframe caused a chain of events leading to the two crashes. This struggle of fitting a larger engine onto a lower, 1960’s fuselage did not start with the MAX, but actually originated in 1984 with the 737-300. A more rigorous and independent government safety regulation which mandated airframe rather than software changes enabled the 737-300 to fly safely with the larger engines. Critically, changes in delegation and oversight authority between 1984 and 2016 allowed Boeing to hide and obfuscate design details from the FAA and to capture safety regulatory authority from the FAA.
History of Delegation
In the aviation context, delegation is the assignment of safety duties to a private company with subject area expertise. Delegation has occurred throughout much of aviation history. As the private sector will contain many experts and will be on the forefront of innovation, few would argue against some level of delegation. Delegation should occur in a regime where the FAA maintains supervision and authority over the delegated representative.
Starting in the 1940’s, the FAA’s predecessor agency, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), delegated much of new aircraft testing to “designees”, employees of airplane manufacturers on temporary assignment to the FAA. In 1958, the FAA enacted the Delegation Option Authorization (DOA) program in response to expansion in the aircraft industry to certify small airplanes, engines, and propellers. Congress authorized the FAA to appoint designees to examine, test, or inspect airplanes to support aircraft certification.
In the 1960’s, the FAA created the Designated Alteration Station (DAS) program, allowing approved engineering employees of repair stations to issue supplemental type certificates (STCs) and related airworthiness certificates. DAS still allows eligible air carriers to issue STCs and related airworthiness certificates.
